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OPENING THE DOOR TO SINGLE GOVERNMENT: THE 2002
MARYLAND REDISTRICTING DECISION GIVES THE COURTS
TOO MUCH POWER IN AN HISTORICALLY POLITICAL ARENA
I.

INTRODUCTION
I speak tonight for the dignity of man and the destiny of democracy
. . . . But even if we pass this bill, the battle will not be over. What
happened in Selma is part of a far larger movement which reaches
into every section and State of America. It is the effort of American
Negroes to secure for themselves the full blessings of American life.
Their cause must be our cause too, because it is not just Negroes but
really it is all of us, who must overcome the crippling legacy of bigotry
and injustice. And we shall overcome.}

-Lyndon B. Johnson
Since President Lyndon B. Johnson introduced the original Voting
Rights Act ("VRA") to protect minority voting rights in 1965,2 the requirements of the VRA have continuously conflicted with the requirements set forth in the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution and other state constitutional requirements for redistricting. 3 For example, the VRA is often incompatible with the Maryland
constitutional redistricting requirements of compactness, contiguity,
and due regard for natural boundaries. 4
1. President Lyndon B.Johnson, Voting Rights Address to Congress (Mar. 15,
1965). See also GREAT ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM RECONSTRUCTION
TO THE PRESENT DAY, 1864-1981, 459-61 (Richard Hofstadter & Beatrice
Hofstadter eds., 1982). President Johnson refers to "Bloody Sunday" in
Selma, Alabama. We Shall Overcome: Historic Places of the Civil Rights Movement. Selma to Montgomery March, available at http://www.cr.nps.gov/NR/
travel.civilrights/aI4.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2003). On Sunday, March 7,
1965, six hundred civil rights marchers set out to Montgomery for the
Selma-ta-Montgomery march for voting rights. Id. They had traveled only
six blocks to a local bridge, however, when state and local lawmen attacked
them with billy-clubs and tear gas. [d. Two days later Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. led a symbolic march to the Selma local bridge. [d.
2. Richard Briffault, The Contested Right to Vote, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1506, 1520
(2002).
3. David Guinn et aI., Redistricting in 2001 and Beyond: Navigating the Narrow
Channel Between the Equal Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act, 51 BAYLOR
L. REv. 225, 266-67 (1999); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For a
discussion of the VRA, see infra Part II.B.
4. Guinn, supra note 3, at 266-67; MD. CONST. art. III, § 4 (2002) ("[e]ach
legislative district shall consist of adjoining territory, be compact in form,
and of substantially equal population ... regard shall be given to natural
boundaries and the boundaries of political subdivision").
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Because of these competing requirements, redistricting often involves the drawing of a redistricting map with plans for ensuing litigation, resulting in the map being struck down and returned to the
legislature for re-drafting. 5 Present day redistricting problems are typically resolved through litigation, rather than through legislation. 6
Judge Raker's dissent in the 2002 Court of Appeals of Maryland case,
In re Legislative Districting of the State, reminds courts that the process of
redistrictinlif remains an "inherently political and legislative-not judicial-task."
The 2002 Maryland redistricting plan, proposed by former Governor Glendening and the Maryland General Assembly, should not have
been rejected by the Court of Appeals of Maryland. The court failed
to consider the VRA and treated county line cross-overs in the
Glendening plan as per se violations of the Maryland Constitution. 8 Instead of balancing the requirements of the Maryland Constitution
against those mandated by federal law, such as the VRA and the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court of Appeals of Maryland statically applied
Maryland constitutional law, leaving no room for the federal requirements. 9 Furthermore, the court erred in its remedy when it drew its
own redistricting plan without allowing the Governor and General Assembly to redesign the plan themselves.1O In doing this, the court of
appeals delved into a typically political arena traditionally intended
for the legislature.}}
Part II of this comment will address the competing federal requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. It also looks to how other
states have recently interpreted these federal mandates in their districting schemes. Part III outlines the Maryland constitutional requirements, focusing on compactness, contiguity, and due regard for
natural boundaries. Part IV provides an in-depth analysis of the proposed 2002 Maryland districting plan, and proposes that the plan
should have been upheld by the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
II.

THE CONFLICTING FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS

A.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution provides that "[n]o state shall ... deny to any person
5. Guinn, supra note 3, at 227.
6. In re Legislative Dist. of State, 370 Md. 312, 376, 805 A.2d 292, 329-30
(2002) (Raker, j., dissenting).
7. Id. (quoting Jensen v. Wisc. Elections Bd., 639 N.W.2d 537, 540 (2002)).
8. See generally id.
9. See id. at 380-81, 805 A.2d at 332. See infra Part III for a discussion of the
Maryland constitutional requirements.
10. See In re Legislative Dist. of State, 370 Md. at 374-75, 805 A.2d at 328-29.
11. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. "12 The central
mandate of the clause "is [to maintain] racial neutrality in governmental decisionmaking."13
The United States recognized its first racial gerrymander 14 claim in
Shaw v. Reno ("Shaw I '') .15 In Shaw I, the Supreme Court held that the
appellants had stated a racial gerrymander claim sufficient to defeat a
motion to dismiss. 16 The Court, however, was careful to point out that
not all race-conscious redistricting was unconstitutional. 17
In Shaw I, the bizarre shapes of two North Carolina voting districts
were a decisive factor in determining that appellants had stated a
cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause alleging an unconstitutional gerrymander. 18 The Court stated that the racial gerrymander claim was "analytically distinct" from a voter dilution claim. 19 The
Court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether
the North Carolina plan constituted an unconstitutional racial gerry-

12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995).
14. The term "gerrymander" refers to the practice of drawing legislative districts to protect incumbents and possibly harm the prospects of other potential candidates. Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. 574, 609, 629
A.2d 646,664 (1993). The Supreme Court has held that "avoiding contests
between incumbents is a permissible reason for states to deviate from creating districts with perfectly equal populations." Id. at 610, 629 A.2d at 664
(citing Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983)). The Court of Appeals of Maryland has construed this to mean that "it is ... permissible for
states to consider incumbents in crafting districts in the first place" and
"incumbent residency is a factor which may legitimately be considered in
redistricting negotiations and plans." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The term "racial gerrymander" derives its roots from the history of
gerrymandering decisions. It is distinct, however, because instead of trying
to protect incumbents, districts are drawn to purposefully divide minority
populations, preventing them from obtaining majority voting strength in
all possible districts. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 640 (1993) [hereinafter
Shaw IJ.
15. 509 U.S. 630. In Shaw I, a group of North Carolina voters challenged two
districts claiming that their irregular shapes constituted an unconstitutional
gerrymander in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 633-34.
16. Id. at 642, 649.
17. [d. at 642; see also Guinn, supra note 3, at 228. The Court stated that "appellants appear to concede that race-conscious redistricting is not always unconstitutional. That concession is wise: "This Court has never held that
race-conscious state decision making is impermissible in all circumstances."
Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 642.
18. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647-49, 658.
19. Id. at 652; see also Guinn, supra note 3, at 232.
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mander. 20 It instructed the district court to make its determination
applying a strict scrutiny review. 21
Two years later, the same Court decided Miller v. johnson,22 holding
that a bizarre shape of a district is only "circumstantial evidence"23 of a
racial gerrymander, and that "a plaintiff must demonstrate that a district's shape is so bizarre that it is unexplainable other than on the
basis of race .... "24 The Court emphasized that a plaintiff, in addition to introducing evidence of a district's shape and demographics,
must also demonstrate that the legislature's purpose or motivation was
race based. 25 The Court announced that strict scrutiny is to be used
where race is the "predominant factor" motivating the construction of
district boundary lines. 26 It held that the plaintiff, in a racial gerry20. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 658.
[W]e hold only that appellants have stated a claim under the Equal
Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face
that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into
separate voting districts because of their race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification.
[d.
21. [d. The case eventually made it back to the Supreme Court, where they
found the redistricting plan unconstitutional. Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, remanded sub nom. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994), rev'd, 517
U.S. 899, 901-02 (1996).
22. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
23. [d. at 912-13. The Court stated that circumstantial evidence is "persuasive,"
and that circumstantial evidence of a district's bizarre shape, together with
demographics, may be enough to meet the plaintiff's burden in proving
race was a predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to draw
district lines as it did. [d. at 916.
24. [d. at 910.
25. [d. at 915-16.
26. [d. at 915-20. In a concurring opinion,justice O'Connor defends the use of
strict scrutiny, stating:
I understand the threshold standard the Court adopts-that "the
legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principIes ... to racial considerations,"-to be a demanding one. To
invoke strict scrutiny, a plaintiff must show that the State has relied
on race in a substantial disregard of customary and traditional districting practices. Those practices provide a crucial frame of reference and therefore constitute a significant governing principle in
cases of this kind. The standard would be no different if a legislature had drawn the boundaries to favor some other ethnic group;
certainly the standard does not treat efforts to create majority-minority districts less favorably than similar efforts on behalf of other
groups. Indeed, the driving force behind the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was the desire to end legal discrimination
against blacks.

Application of the Court's standard does not throw into doubt the
vast majority of the Nation's 435 congressional districts, where presumably the States have drawn the boundaries in accordance with
their customary districting principles. That is so even though race
may well have been considered in the redistricting process. But
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mander case, has the burden of proving that "the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but not
limited to compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial
considerations. "27
The Court did not answer the question of what compelling governmental interests can overcome strict scrutiny, namely, whether compliance with § 2 or § 5 of the VRA is a compelling interest. 28 The Court
avoided this question again in Shaw v. Hunt ("Shaw II") ,29 the result of
the remanded Shaw 1. 30 In Shaw II, North Carolina created two specific districts to comply with § 2 and § 5 of the VRAY North Carolina
asserted that the creation of district 12 was done in order to comply
with § 5 of the VRA, yet the Supreme Court held that creation of such
a district was not a remedy demanded by § 5. 32 The Court affirmed
application of the Court's standard helps achieve Shaw's basic objective of making extreme instances of gerrymandering subject to
meaningful judicial review.
[d. at 928-29 (O'Connor,]., concurring) (quoting the majority).
27. [d. at 916.
28. [d. at 921. Section 2 of the VRA provides:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race or color ....

29.
30.
31.
32.

A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based
on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a
class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its
members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected
class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision
is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population.
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) - (b) (2000).
Section 5 of the VRA provides, in part, that the court or Attorney General
must approve a change that would affect voting rights:
Whenever a State or political subdivision ... shall enact to or seek
to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different
from that in force or effect" to ensure that "the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right
to vote on account of race or color.
42 U.S.C. § 1973c. See also infra Part II.B (discussing the VRA).
517 U.S. 899, 911 (1996) [hereinafter Shaw Ill.
509 U.S. 630 (1993).
Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 908-14.
[d. at 911-13.
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the district court's holding that circumstantial evidence (the districts'
shapes) and direct evidence (the legislative intent) presented at trial
supported the conclusion that race was the predominant factor in creating the districts. 33 While the Supreme Court in Shaw II ultimately
found that the majority-minority districts were unnecessarily created,34
the Court again announced that it would not address whether compliance with the VRA is considered to be a compelling governmental
interest when developing a redistricting or reapportionment plan. 35
The aforementioned cases, among others, demonstrate the uncertainty that surrounds the redistricting process when considering the
relationship between the Equal Protection Clause and the VRA. 36
The Supreme Court leaves open many questions making it difficult
for lower courts to render decisions. As a result, redistricting has become an area of law that demands more consistency in its application
from both the lower courts and the United States Supreme Court.

B.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965

The VRA of 196537 helps to ensure the Fifteenth Amendment's
guarantee that the "rights of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."38 Yet, as
previously discussed, the well-intentioned VRA has nonetheless
clashed with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 39 Sections 2 and 5 of the VRA often conflict with the Equal
Protection Clause. 4o Section 2 provides that states and their subdivisions may not enforce any practice that undermines minority voting
strengthY Section 5 provides that covered jurisdictions must first
have any changes in voting practices approved by either the Attorney
General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 In effect, § 5 established a regulatory scheme prohibiting certain districts from changing their voting practices.
33. [d. at 905-06.
34. [d. at 916-17.
35. [d. at 911. The Court stated: "In Miller, we expressly left open the question
whether under the proper circumstances compliance with the [VRA], on its
own, could be a compelling interest. Here once again we do not reach that
question .... " [d. (internal citations omitted).
36. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517
U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw II, 517 U.S. 899; Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900
(1995); Shaw 1,509 U.S. 630 (1993).
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb-l (2000).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XV § 1; see Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. 574,
603, 629 A.2d 646, 660 (1993).
39. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; supra Part I1.A.
40. See Guinn, supra note 3, at 226 n.2; see also supra note 28.
41. See supra note 28.
42. [d.
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The Supreme Court interpreted minority voting strength requirements in White v. Regester. 43 The Court held that practices that negatively affect minority voting strength, when examined under the
totality of the circumstances, will not survive challenges under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. 44 In order to establish a
violation of § 2 of the VRA, lower federal courts interpreted White to
mean that a minority group only needed to show that the challenged
voting practice had a discriminatory effect on its political participation. 45 In 1980, however, the Supreme Court stated in Mobile v. Bolden
that White also required a showing of discriminatory intent in order to
prevail on a claim under § 2 of the VRA. 46
As a result of the Mobile decision, Congress rewrote § 2 of the VRA
to reflect the pre-Mobile standard of only requiring minorities to prove
discriminatory effect, thereby eliminating the intent requirementY
In 1986, the Supreme Court responded to this change in Thornburg v.
Cingles. 48 The Court stated that the important question in a VRA action is "whether 'as a result of the challenged practice or structure,
43. 412 U.S. 755 (1973), vacated by 422 U.S. 935 (1975).
44. See id. at 769-70; Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. 574, 603, 629 A.2d
646,660 (1993).
45. Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. at 603, 629 A.2d at 660-61; see, e.g.,
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1304-06 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc),
aJfd sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976)
(per curiam).
46. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980).
47. See Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. at 604, 629 A.2d at 661; Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000».
48. 478 U.S. 30, 34 (1986). The Gingles factors to identify a § 2 violation are:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the
state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members
of the minority group to register, to vote, or otheIWise to participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or
political subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has
used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements,
anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures
that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the
minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members
of the minority group have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the
state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in
such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder
their ability to participate effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by
overt or subtle racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have
been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
Id. at 36-37.
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plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice.' "49
In Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board,50 the Supreme Court faced the
question of what, if any, relationship exists between § 2 and § 5 of the
VRA. 5 1 In the initial Bossier Parrish redistricting plan, there were no
majority-minority districts. 52 As such, the NAACP subsequently proposed a plan that contained two majority-minority districts, thereby
revealing that the minority group in Bossier Parrish was sufficiently
large and geographically compact to form these districts. 53 Upon receipt of this information, the Attorney General found a § 2 violation
of the VRA and subsequently denied § 5 preclearance. 54
The Supreme Court noted that "recognizing § 2 violations as a basis
for denying § 5 preclearance would inevitably make compliance with
§ 5 contingent on compliance with § 2."55 The Court rejected this
approach, stating that § 2 and § 5 were intended to combat two, very
different evils. 56 The Court stated that § 2 applies to all states and was
intended to prohibit dilution of minority voting strength. 57 Section 5,
on the other hand, only applies to certain states and was intended to
prevent retrogressive changes to their existing voting procedures. 58
The Supreme Court also stated that the burden of proof differs between § 2 and § 5 claims. 59 With a § 2 claim, the burden of proving
vote dilution initially lies with the plaintiff.5O With a § 5 claim, the
state or political subdivision has the burden of proving the absence of
discrimination. 61 Therefore, even if liability under § 2 exists,
preclearance under § 5 should still be granted if no regression
exists. 62
C.

Recent Treatment of Redistricting By Other States

1.

Texas

One of the most important redistricting cases to reach the Supreme
Court was the Texas case Bush v. Vera. 63 The United States District
49. Id. at 44 (quoting S. REp. No. 97-417, at 28 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.CAN. 177,206).
50. 520 U.S. 471 (1997).
51. Id. at 474.
52. Id. at 474-75.
53. See id. at 475.
54. See id. at 475-76. See supra note 28 for the text of § 5 of the VRA.
55. Bossier Parrish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. at 477.
56. See id. at 476-77.
57. Id. at 479.
58. See id. at 477-78.
59. See id. at 478-80.
60. See id. at 479-80.
61. See id. at 477-78.
62. See id. at 486-88.
63. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
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Court for the Southern District of Texas found that three districts
were unconstitutional gerrymanders. 64 The district court found that
the three districts "were all designed with highly irregular boundaries
that take no heed of traditional districting criteria,"65 and that the
districts "were not narrowly tailored to fulfill the State's compelling
interest in avoiding liability under § 2 ... of the federal [VRA]."66
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's finding of unconstitutionality in this "mixed motive"67 case. 68 Upon a finding that the
districts were created predominately because of race, the Court applied strict scrutiny, stating that compliance with § 2 of the VRA is a
compelling governmental interest. 69 The Court held that because the
districts were not at all compact and each had highly irregular borders, they were not narrowly tailored to serve the State's interest in
avoiding VRA liability. 70
Professor Guinn explained that Justice O'Connor provides "the best
guidance for states and lower courts in navigating the narrow channels and shoals of [§ 2 of the VRA] ."71 Justice O'Connor uses the
following five factors in her analysis: (1) states may intentionally create
majority-minority districts and take race into consideration, as long as
they do not subordinate traditional redistricting criteria to the use of
race for its own sake or as a proxy;72 (2) where there is racial polarization of voting, the VRA prohibits states from adopting districting plans
that have the effect of allowing minority voters "less opportunity than
other members of the electorate to ... elect representatives of their
choice";73 (3) the state has a compelling interest in avoiding liability
under the VRA; 74 (4) if a state pursues that compelling interest by
creating a district that substantially addresses the liability it faces, and
the district does not deviate substantially from traditional districting
64. Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1345 (S.D. Tex. 1994), affd sub nom.
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
65. !d. at 1345. The Texas Constitution required the legislature to use natural
geographic boundaries, contiguity, compactness, and conformity to political subdivisions. Id. at 1333.
66. Id. at 1345.
67. The Supreme Court found that while the three districts were created to
comply with § 2 of the VRA, there was also extensive evidence that the legislature was concerned with ensuring the reelection of incumbent congressmen. Bush, 517 U.S. at 959.
68. Id. at 986.
69. See id. at 977.
70. Id. at 979.
71. See Guinn, supra note 3, at 241 (quoting The Honorable Deval Patrick, former Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dept. ofJustice, Address
at the Nat. Conference of State Legislatures (July 29, 1996), available at
http:www.ncsl.org/statevote98/dojhtm.htm.
72. Bush, 517 U.S. at 993 (O'Connor,]., concurring).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 994.
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principles, the plan will be deemed to be narrowly tailored;75 and (5)
districts that are "bizarrely shaped and non-compact" because of predominately racial reasons are unconstitutional. 76
2.

Colorado

In the case of In re Reapportionment of the Colorado General Assembly,77
the Supreme Court of Colorado declared the decennial redistricting
plan unconstitutional. 78 The court found that the 2002 plan did not
comply with the criteria of article V, sections 46 and 47 of the Colorado Constitution 79 because (1) it was "not sufficiently attentive to
county boundaries" and (2) it was "not accompanied by an adequate
factual showing that less drastic alternatives could not have satisfied
the equal population requirement."8o Because there were no federal
violations present, the reapportionment plan proposed by the Commission was struck down. 81
In its decision, the Supreme Court of Colorado provided an important analysis of the standard of review that a court must use when reviewing such a decision. The court stated that its role "is a narrow
one: to measure the present reapportionment plan against constitutional standards. The choice among alternative plans, each consistent
with constitutional requirements, is for the Commission and not the
75. Id.

76. Id.
77. 45 P.3d 1237 (Colo. 2002).

78. Id. at 1241. Traditionally, reapportionment has been a matter of concern
for citizens of Colorado. See id. at 1242-43. Colorado has a long history of
citizen initiated statutes that have shaped the law in this area. Id. In 1966,
one of the most noteworthy citizen initiated amendments to the constitution was passed, which (1) imposed a requirement of single-member districts and (2) "allowed the General Assembly to add part of one county to
all or part of another county in the formation of senate and house districts,
if necessary to meet equal population requirements." Id. at 1243. In 1974,
voters approved a citizen-initiated constitutional amendment that created
the Reapportionment Commission to do the work of the General Assembly.
Id. at 1244. The purpose of this initiative was to create an independent
body to accomplish reapportionment. Id. Furthermore, Colorado is one of
the few states in which a majority-minority district was ordered by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in order to comply
with federal requirements. See id. at 1242-43. See also Sanchez v. Colorado,
97 F.3d 1303, 1329 (10th Cir. 1996) (requiring the redrawing of a house
district in order to provide the substantial Hispanic population a fair opportunity to elect a representative of its own choosing).
79. Section 46 requires that the state be divided into as many districts as there
are members of the senate and house. COLO. CaNST. art. V, § 46. Section
47 requires that when a senatorial or representative district shall be composed of more than one county, they shall be as contiguous and compact as
possible. COLO. CaNST. art. V, § 47.
80. In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 45 P.3d at 1246.
81. Id.
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Court."82 It is the court's job to determine whether the Commission
followed the correct procedures and applied the federal and Colorado law in their redistricting plan. 83 The Supreme Court of Colorado further stated: "We do not redraw the reapportionment map for
the Commission."84
The court recognized that federal law superimposes requirements
on the Colorado constitutional criteria. 85 In order of priority, the
court placed the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifteenth Amendment first, § 2 of the VRA second, and
the Colorado constitutional requirements last. 86 In analyzing such
plans, the Supreme Court of Colorado first looked to see if there were
any federal law violations. 87 If there are any actual or probable federal
law violations, the court begins its analysis with that law. 88 If there are
no federal law issues, the court can then proceed to Colorado constitutional criteria. 89
While neither Bush nor In re Reapportionment of Colorado General Assembly directly addressed all of the issues found in the 2002 Maryland
redistricting plan, each offers valuable insight on how to analyze the
special problems created by modern redistricting practices. One of
the most important aspects of both decisions is the emphasis placed
on compliance with federal requirements, specifically the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the VRA.90 While
state constitutional requirements do play an important role in determining the validity of reapportionment plans, state requirements are
often superseded by federal law. 91
III.

MARYLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

The Maryland Constitution requires that all legislative districts
"shall consist of adjoining territory, be compact in form, and of substantially equal population," and that "[d]ue regard shall be given to
natural boundaries and the boundaries of political subdivisions."92
The three main requirements stemming from this part of the Maryland Constitution are compactness, contiguity, and the due regard
82. Id. at 1247 (quoting In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647
P.2d 191, 194 (Colo. 1982)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1247.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing In reReapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 828 P.2d 185,193
(Colo. 1992)).
89. Id.
90. See supra notes 66-76, 86-89 and accompanying text.
9l. See supra notes 66-76, 86-89 and accompanying text.
92. MD. CONST. art. III, § 4.
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principle. 93 Courts in states with similar constitutional provisions have
held that these requirements were created, and intended, to prevent
political gerrymandering. 94
A.

The Compactness Requirement

Geometrically, compactness is "a circle with the perimeter of a district equidistant from its center."95 Maryland, like the majority of
states,96 has not defined compactness in simple geometric terms. 97
Because there is no single measure of compactness, in the context of
legislative redistricting, it is usually viewed as a relative standard. 98
The compactness requirement is generally recognized as subservient to the dominant federal Constitutional requirement of the
Equal Protection Clause. 99 Some courts have held that "compliance
with the state constitutional compactness requirement is
mandatory."lOo Uniquely shaped districts, however, usually do not
constitute evidence of gerrymandering. lOI Oddly shaped districts,
therefore, do not provide definitive evidence of failure by the General
Assembly to comply with the compactness requirement. 102 Instead, a
court must also look to other legitimate constraints that affect redistricting, such as the VRA and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and from there determine exclusively whether
the compactness requirement was fully taken into account. 103 Thus,
the compactness requirement is considered by the Court of Appeals
of Maryland to be a "functional" requirement. 104
93. In re Legislative Dist. of State, 299 Md. 658,674,475 A.2d 428, 436 (1984).
94. Id. at 675, 475 A.2d at 436.
95. Id. at 676, 475 A.2d at 437.
96. The possible exception is Colorado. Id. See Acker v. Love, 496 P.2d 75, 76

(Colo. 1972) (en banc).
97. In re Legislative Dist. of State, 299 Md. at 676, 475 A.2d at 437.
98. In re Legislative Dist. of State, 370 Md. 312, 381, 805 A.2d 292, 333 (2002)

(Raker, j., dissenting).
99. See In re Legislative Dist. of State (1984), 299 Md. at 680,475 A.2d at 439.
See also In re Interrogatories by Gen. Assembly, 497 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Colo.
1972); Preisler v. Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Mo. 1975); Davenport
v. Apportionment Comm'n, 319 A.2d 718, 722 (NJ. 1974); Schneider v.
Rockefeller, 293 N.E.2d 67,70 (N.Y. 1972); Commonwealth exrel. Specterv.
Levin, 293 A.2d 15, 18 (Pa. 1972).
100. In re Legislative Dist. of State (1984),299 Md. at 680,475 A.2d at 439 (discussing In re Legislative Dist. of Gen. Assembly, 193 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa
1972); Acker, 496 P.2d 75; Preisler, 528 S.W.2d 422).
101. Id. at 687, 475 A.2d at 443.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 679, 687, 475 A.2d at 439, 443.
104. In re Legislative Dist. of State, 370 Md. 312, 383, 805 A.2d 292, 334 (2002)

(Raker, j., dissenting).
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The Contiguity Requirement

The contiguity requirement is also a functional consideration. 105 It
requires "that there be no division between one part of a district's
territory and the rest of the district."106 The contiguity requirement is
often "affected and influenced by the population equality
requirement." I 07

C.

The Requirement of Due Regard for Natural Boundaries

A redistricting plan shows due regard for boundaries when it keeps
cities, counties, and towns intact wherever possible in light of other
political redistricting considerations. lOS The primary purpose of this
principle is to maintain districts that enable voters to preserve an "orientation" to their district. IOg The due regard principle appears to be
the most fluid of the three requirements in Article 4 of the Maryland
Constitution. I 10
In her dissent in the 2002 legislative districting decision, Judge
Raker looks to the interpretation of similar language in the due regard principle of the Massachusetts Constitution by the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts. 111 The Massachusetts court held that the due
regard principle requires districts to be formed "as nearly as may be"
without uniting two counties, towns, or cities. 112 The court stated that
as long as the legislature took reasonable efforts to conform to the
requirements of the Constitution it would uphold the legislature's redistricting plan. 113
105. Id.
106. In re Legislative Dist. of State (1984), 299 Md. at 675-76, 475 A.2d at 437.
Contiguous territory is further described as "territory touching, adjoining
and connected, as distinguished from territory separated by other territory." Id. at 676, 475 A.2d at 437.
107. In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 383, 805 A.2d at 334
(Raker, j., dissenting).
108. Id. at 384,805 A.2d at 335 (Raker,]., dissenting).
109. In re Legislative Dist. of State (1984), 299 Md. at 681,475 A.2d at 439.
110. Id.
111. In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 385, 805 A.2d at 335
(Raker, j., dissenting).
112. Id. (citing Mayor of Cambridge v. Sec'y of the Commonwealth, 765 N.E.2d
749 (Mass. 2002».
113. Mayor of Cambridge, 765 N.E.2d at 755. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts also stated:
Because the redistricting process involves the consideration of
these competing factors, the clause requiring the Legislature to
avoid the division of cities, towns, and counties "as nearly as may
be" cannot be interpreted to require that the Legislature adopt the
plan with the absolute minimum number of districts that cross
county, town, or city lines.
Id.
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The Three Requirements Considered Together

The three requirements from section 4 of the Maryland Constitution were intended to work together to ensure legislative districts were
organized as to provide fair representation. 1l4 Even with this common goal, however, the three requirements often come into conflict
with one another. 1IS The Court of Appeals of Maryland explained
this in its 1984 redistricting decision, stating that a "population could
be apportioned with mathematical exactness if not for the territorial
requirements, and compactness could be achieved more easily if substantially equal population apportionment and due regard for boundaries were not required."116
In the 2002 court of appeals districting decision, the majority asserts
that these three requirements serve as "legitimate reasons for states to
deviate from creating districts with perfectly equal populations."1l7
The majority points out that the Supreme Court has held that there
are certain times when deviations from the equal population principle
are constitutionally permissibleYs This is a narrow exception, however, that does little to advance the majority'S idea that when state and
federal requirements conflict, the state requirements will prevail. I19
IV.

THE PROPOSED MARYLAND 2002 PLAN BY GOVERNOR
GLENDENING AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Maryland has only twenty-four political subdivisions-twenty-three
counties and Baltimore City.120 In 1992, Maryland had eighteen
shared senatorial districts. 121 Baltimore County's boundary with Baltimore City was crossed five times, while the boundary with other counties was crossed twice. 122 Four districts consisted of more than two
counties. I23 One district in the 1992 plan consisted of more than four
counties. 124 The redistricting plan of 1992 was an exception to the
usual Maryland redistricting plans, which considered Baltimore City
114. In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 360-61, 805 A.2d at 320-21
(quoting In re Legislative Dist. of State (1984),299 Md. at 681,475 A.2d at
440).
115. Id. at 361,805 A.2d at 321 (quoting In re Legislative Dist. of State (1984),
299 Md. at 681, 475 A.2d at 440).
116. In re Legislative Dist. of State (1984), 299 Md. at 681, 475 A.2d at 440.
117. In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 356,805 A.2d at 318 (citing
Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S 533,577 (1964».
118. Id. The Reynolds Court explained that "[a] State may legitimately desire to
maintain the integrity of various political subdivisions, insofar as possible,
and provide for compact districts of contiguous territory in designing a legislative apportionment scheme." Reynolds, 337 U.S. at 578.
119. See infra notes 137-140 and accompanying text.
120. Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. 574, 620, 629 A.2d 646,669 (1993).
121. In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002),370 Md. at 364, 805 A.2d at 322.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 364, 805 A.2d at 323.
124. See id.
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and the counties as the primary elements in apportionment, and only
crossed over subdivision lines to reach the goal of population equality.125 Despite these frequent crossovers, the legislative plan was upheld as constitutional and was thus implemented. 126
The proposed 2002 plan had twenty-two shared senatorial districts,
only four more than the 1992 plan. 127 In the 2002 plan, "[t]he number of districts shared by Baltimore City and County remained static,
at five."128 The Baltimore County line was crossed nine times, as opposed to seven in the 1992 plan. 129 In the State's 2002 plan there
were five districts that consisted of more than one county, an increase
of only one since the 1992 plan. I30 Also, in the 2002 plan there were
two districts that consisted of more than four counties, which again
increased by one. 131

A.

The 2002 Plan Should Have Been Upheld

In the 2002 redistricting decision, the court of appeals majority
places a significant amount of emphasis on these aforementioned differences,132 but the emphasis should not be placed on the number of
times the lines are crossed. Instead, the emphasis should be on why
the court found that the 2002, and not the 1992 plan, violated the
Maryland Constitution because they are seemingly very similar. The
court addressed their similarity by pointing out that in the constitutionally upheld 1992 plan, the Baltimore City/Baltimore County region came close to violating the due regard provision, whereas the
2002 plan was held unconstitutional because there were two more
cross-overs in the Baltimore City/Baltimore County region. I33
The 1992 court explains that there is a great danger in splitting
districts because when there are county-line cross-overs the representatives will have divided loyalty.I34 The 1992 court uses District 42,
which splits up the "tightly knit Jewish population of Pikesville" into
three districts, as an example. 135 But the court holds that this, in itself, does not make the plan unconstitutional, stating that "while the
fact that district 42 splits the Jewish community may be regrettable,
regard for that 'community of interest' cannot overcome other consti125. Id. at 368, 805 A.2d at 325.
126. Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. 574, 611, 615-16, 621 A.2d 646,665,
667 (1993).
127. In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 364, 805 A.2d at 322-23.
128. Id. at 364, 805 A.2d at 323.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 365, 805 A.2d at 323.
131. Id.
132. See In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 364-65, 805 A.2d at 32223.
133. See id. at 363-64,805 A.2d at 322-23 (quoting Legislative Redistricting Cases,
331 Md. at 614, 629 A.2d at 666).
134. Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. at 615, 629 A.2d at 666.
135. Id. at 615, 629 A.2d at 667.
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tutional considerations."136 One of the constitutional considerations
noted by the court was that District 10 is a "minority district whose
creation was mandated by the Voting Rights Act."137 The important
reasoning behind this is the recognition of the fluidity of the due regard principle and the fact that it must sometimes give way to federal
requirements. 138 When challenged with other considerations, the
due regard principle will often yield to those requirements. 139 The
mere fact that the numbers are slightly higher in other areas of the
latter plan does not unquestionably prove unconstitutionality.
In the 2002 decision, the State asserted this same argument,
describing the Article III requirements, including the due regard
principle, as "secondary" and stated that these requirements must
yield to other mandates, such as the VRA. 140 The majority of the 2002
court flatly rejects this argument. 141 According to Article II of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, state constitutional requirements yield to
federal requirements. 142 In previous Maryland redistricting decisions
this has been interpreted to mean that, while consideration of the Article III requirements is mandatory, the federal requirements trump
state law. 143 Nevertheless, the 2002 majority states that the Maryland
Constitutional requirements are not secondary considerations. 144
This is the first example of the court's unexplained departure from
past practice.
The majority stated that there was an excessive number of political
crossings in the proposed 2002 plan. 145 The court relied on other
jurisdictions to support the proposition that this rendered the plan
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id. at 615, 629 A.2d at 666-67.
See id. at 615, 629 A.2d at 667.
Id. at 615, 629 A.2d at 667.
In re Legislative Dist. of State, 370 Md. 312, 366, 805 A.2d 292, 324 (2002).
Id. at 370, 805 A.2d at 326.
MD. CONST. art. II. Article II states:
The Constitution of the United States, and the Laws made, or
which shall be made, in pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States,
are, and shall be the Supreme Law of the State; and the Judges of
this State, and all the People of this State, are, and shall be bound
thereby; anything in the Constitution or Law of this State to the
contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
143. See Legislative Redistricting Cases (1993),331 Md. at 615,629 A.2d at 667
(stating that when requirements conflict with each other the due regard
principle "will often be the first to yield"); In re Legislative Dist. of State, 299
Md. 658, 680, 475 A.2d 428, 439 (1984) (stating that "the compactness requirement is subservient, in application, to the dominant federal constitutional requirement of substantial equality of population among districts").
144. In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 370,805 A.2d at 326.
145. Id. at 368, 805 A.2d at 325.
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unconstitutional. 146 In previous Maryland reapportionment cases,
however, the court has consistently recognized that the number of
crossings of political divisions, alone, is not evidence of unconstitutionality.147 This is a second example of the court's departure from
past Maryland redistricting procedure.
The 2002 Glendening plan was approved and filed by the Maryland
General Assembly.148 A plan approved in this manner carries with it a
presumption of validity.149 The majority allocated the burden of
proof to the state and held that the State failed to carry it.150 As Judge
Raker points out in her dissent, however, it does not make sense to
place the burden on the State; it should have been placed on the petitioners alleging unconstitutionality. 151 She correctly identifies the majority's argument as a nonsequitur, stating that "[b]y definition, a
presumption of validity requires that the burden of proof is upon the
party attempting to overcome the presumption. The plaintiffs challenging the plan bear the burden of establishing that the adopted
plan is unconstitutional."152 This is the third example of the court's
departure from traditional practices.
146. Id. See In re Reapportionment of the Colo. Gen. Assembly, 45 P.3d 1237,
1248 (Colo. 2002) (stating that "[a] direct line of accountability between
citizens [and their elected officials] is at the heart of responsive government in Colorado and is built into the county-oriented design of the Constitution's reapportionment provisions"); Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp.
68, 88 (D. Colo. 1982) (finding that "[t]hese political subdivisions (counties and municipalities) should remain undivided whenever possible because the sense of community derived from established governmental units
tends to foster effective representation"); Davenport v. Apportionment
Comm'n, 304 A.2d 736, 745 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973) (stating that
"[ t] he citizens of each county have a community of interest by virtue of
their common responsibility to provide for public needs and their investment in the plants and facilities established to that end") (quotingJackman
v. Bodine, 205 A.2d 713, 718 (1964)); In re Reapportionment of Hartland,
624 A.2d 323,330 (Vt. 1993) (observing that "unnecessary fragmentation of
these [political subdivisions] limits the ability of local constituencies to organize effectively and increases voter confusion and isolation").
147. See Legislative Redistricting Cases (1993), 331 Md. at 615-16, 629 A.2d at
667 (holding that the fluid due regard principle allows for reasonable
county line cross-overs); In re Legislative Dist. of State, 299 Md. 658, 680,
475 A.2d 428, 439 (1984) (stating that "it cannot ordinarily be determined
by a mere visual examination of an electoral map whether the compactness
requirement has been violated").
148. See In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002),370 Md. at 328, 805 A.2d at 301.
149. Legislative Redistricting Cases (1993),331 Md. at 614,629 A.2d at 666. See
Erfer v. Commonwealth, 794 A.2d 325, 331 (Pa. 2002) (stating that "[a]s
with any legislative enactment, [a redistricting plan] enjoys a presumption
of constitutionality" and that such a plan will be declared unconstitutional
only if it is "clearly, palpably and plainly unconstitutional").
150. In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002),370 Md. at 368, 805 A.2d at 325.
151. Id. at 387,805 A.2d at 337 (Raker,]., dissenting).
152. Id. at 387-88, 805 A.2d at 337 (Raker,]., dissenting).
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The Court of Appeals of Maryland Should Have Allowed the Governor
and General Assembly to Redraw the Map

The majority of the 2002 court makes clear from the outset that it
"do[es] not tread unreservedly into this 'political thicket'; rather, [it
proceeds] in the knowledge that judicial intervention ... is wholly
unavoidable."153 But when the court declared the Glendening plan
unconstitutional and drafted its own plan, the court delved wholeheartedly and unjustifiably into the political arena.
The Maryland Constitution grants the Court of Appeals of Maryland the power to review the constitutionality of a redistricting plan
when it is challenged by citizens of the state. I54 The court, in accordance with federal and state requirements, has the duty to decide if
the plan is constitutional. I55 The Maryland Constitution also forbids
the branches of government from usurping power from any other
branch. 156 The duty to redistrict is an executive and legislative function, vested in the Governor and the General Assembly.I57 Nowhere in
the constitution is this power expressly given to the judiciary.15s
The Court of Appeals of Maryland does have the power to review
whether lower courts have applied the constitutional requirements. 159
The court, however, does not have the power to decide whether the
legislature could have drawn a more constitutional plan. 160 In
Beaubien v. Ryan, the Supreme Court of Illinois answered the question
of who should assess what trade-offs must be made in the redistricting
process:
Who, then, must finally determine whether or not a district is
as compact as it could or should have been made? Surely not
the courts, for this would take from the legislature all discretion in the matter and vest it in the courts, where it does not
belong .... There is a vast difference between determining
whether the principle of compactness of territory has been
applied at all or not, and whether or not the nearest practical application to perfect compactness has been attained.
153. In reLegislative Dist. of State (2002),370 Md. at 353,805 A.2d at 316 (quoting Burton v. Sheheen, 793 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 (D.S.C. 1992), vacated sub
nom. Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Comm., 508 U.S. 968 (1993».
154. MD. CaNST. art. III, § 5.
155. In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 353,805 A.2d at 316.
156. MD. CaNST. art. VIII.
157. MD. CaNST. art. III, § 5.
158. Id.
159. In re Legislative Dist. of State, 299 Md. 658, 668, 475 A.2d 428, 433 (1984).
160. See In re Legislative Dist. of State (1984), 299 Md. at 688, 475 A.2d at 443; see
also Acker v. Love, 496 P.2d 75, 76 (Colo. 1972) (en banc); People v.
Thompson, 40 N.E. 307, 309-310 (Ill. 1895); In re Legislative Redistricting
of the Gen. Assembly, 193 N.W.2d 784, 790 (Iowa 1972); Preisler v. Doherty, 284 S.W.2d 427 (Mo. 1955) (en banc).
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The first is a question which the courts may finally determine; the latter is [not]. 161
The majority of the 2002 court decided that its redistricting plan
was more constitutional and adhered more closely to Maryland's constitutional requirements than the plan proposed by Glendening and
the General Assembly.162 Furthermore, the court did not give the
Governor and General Assembly a chance to redraw the districts that
it found unconstitutional. I63 Instead, the court developed and instated its own plan, stating that there was not enough time for the
Governor to redesign the districts. 164 But the Governor and General
Assembly were never given the opportunity to try to redesign the "unconstitutional" districts in the limited time period; the Court of Appeals of Maryland had already done it for them. 165 This departure
from past practice is not only noteworthy, it shows that the judiciary
usurped power in what was meant to be, and usually is, an "inherently
political"166 arena.
The court-proposed plan contains fewer political division crossovers
than the Glendening plan. I67 While the Maryland constitutional requirements of compactness, contiguity, and due regard for boundaries are adhered to very closely in the court-proposed plan, the
adherence comes at the expense of rights granted by federal requirements. The major concern with the court-proposed plan is that it violates the VRA and takes away minority voting power that is protected
under the ACt. 168
Section 2 of the VRA is very important in the context of redistricting; it ensures that minority voters have an opportunity to elect candidates of their own choosing. 169 Studies have shown that there is a
general cohesiveness of black voting behavior and preferences and
that these preferences differ from those of white voters. 170 It is necessary to take into consideration minority populations in any redistricting plan to protect minority preferences in voting choices. The courtproposed plan does not consider this to the extent that it is required.
161. Beaubien v. Ryan, 762 N.E.2d 501, 507 (Ill. 2001).
162. See In re Legislative Dist. of State, 370 Md. 312, 318-19, 805 A.2d 292, 295-96
(2002).
163. See id. at 323, 805 A.2d at 298.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 398-99, 805 A.2d at 343 (Raker, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 376, 805 A.2d at 330 (Raker, J., dissenting).
167. In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 374, 805 A.2d at 329.
168. Id. at 389-90, 804 A.2d at 338 (Raker, J., dissenting).
169. See id.
170. Id. at 391 n.15, 804 A.2d at 339 n.15 (Raker, J., dissenting). See generally
DAVID A. BOSITIS, JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES,
1999 NATIONAL OPINION POLL (1999); Keith Reeves, The Consequences ofCueing Subtle Appeals to Race, in VOTING HOPES OR FEARS?: WHITE VOTERS, BLACK
CANDIDATES & RACIAL POLITICS IN AMERICA 9, 7&-90 (1997).
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The VRA requires legislatures to create districts that contain a large
concentration of minority voters. 171 This requirement is the only way
to ensure that minority voting strength is not diluted. I72 The VRA
prohibits the practice of "packing," which involves dilution of minority strength by placing a large number of minority voters in one district as to exclude a minority majority in other districts. I73 The
practice of "packing" poses a great threat to minority voting power
and has been characterized as "perhaps the greatest potential for minimizing and diluting the voting strength of racial and ethnic minority
voters."174
Along with "packing" comes the problem of "bleaching," which occurs when minority voting strength is weakened in districts that adjoin
the "packed" district. I75 The "packed" district takes all the minority
voters out of other districts and contains a substantially larger number
of minority voters than necessary for a minority supported candidate
to prevail. 176 Thus, the adjoining districts have significantly less minority voting power than they would have if the "packing" had not
occurred. I77 The districts that have lost the minority strength are
then referred to as "bleached" districts. I78
The Supreme Court, referencing legislative history in Thornburg v.
Gingles, outlined factors that might be probative of a violation of § 2 of
the VRA. I79 In Growe v. Emison,I80 the Court narrowed the Gingles factors down to three. The first factor is that the minority group must be
large enough and geographically compact enough to create a majority
in a district. I81 The second is that the minority group must be politically cohesive. I82 The third factor, which must also be met, is that the
white majority in the district votes sufficiently as a group to defeat the
minority preferred candidate. I83
The court-proposed Maryland plan violates the VRA by "packing"
districts. Districts 40, 41, 44, and 45 in the court-proposed plan contain significantly higher minority populations than those which are
171. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
172. See In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 392-93, 805 A.2d at 340

(Raker,]., dissenting).
173. Id. at 394, 805 A.2d at 341.
174. ]. Gerald Hebert, Redistricting in the Post-2000 Era, 8 GEO.
175.
176.
177.
178.

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

MASON L. REv.
431,439 (2000).
In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 394, 805 A.2d at 341
(Raker, ]., dissenting).
See id. at 394-95, 805 A.2d at 341.
See id.
See id. at 394, 805 A.2d at 341.
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 36-37 (1986). See supra note 48 (discussing the Gingles factors).
507 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1993).
Id. at 40.
!d.
Id.
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necessary to create a majority-minority district. 184 As a result, under
the court-proposed plan, black voters might constitute a voting majority in fewer districts than they should according to the statewide minority population and the VRA. 185
The majority in the 2002 decision plainly states that when the judiciary undertakes to develop a redistricting plan, "politics or political
considerations have no role to play."186 Yet, as the majority acknowledges, politics and political considerations are inseparable from [legislative] redistricting and apportionment"187 and "districting inevitably
has and is intended to have substantial political consequences."188 By
ignoring politics entirely, it is easier to create contiguous, compact
districts.

v.

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals of Maryland should not have rejected the
plan proposed by Governor Glendening and the General Assembly, as
unconstitutional. The plan created districts pursuant to the VRA and
other federally mandated requirements. l89 Although the districts
were not as compact as the districts in the court-proposed plan,190
they were designed in a way to consider the Maryland constitutional
requirements and adhere to them as closely as possible.
Redistricting is a confusing, political area in which the courts provide conflicting law. The Court of Appeals of Maryland made the process more confusing when it redrew the district map itself. Besides
ignoring the separation of powers principle and usurping legislative
power, the court of appeals did not give the legislature any guidance
for designing future redistricting plans. 191 Instead, the court provided its own ideal, non-politically considerate plan. 192 In re Legislative
Districting of the State (2002) simply declares the plan unconstitutional
in favor of what, in the majority view, is a more constitutional plan
without giving the next designer of a redistricting plan in Maryland
any guidance as to what the court expects or how to ensure that the
minority vote in Maryland is protected, as required by the VRA. In
short, the court imposed Maryland redistricting plan opened the door
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
19l.
192.

In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 394, 805 A.2d at 34l.
Id. at 395, 805 A.2d at 34l.
Id. at 354, 805 A.2d at 317.
Id. at 354,805 A.2d at 316-17 (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735,
753 (1973».
Id. at 354,805 A.2d at 317 (quoting Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 753).
See In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 327-28, 805 A.2d at 30l.
See id. at 388-89,805 A.2d at 337-38 (Raker,j., dissenting) ("It is not for the
judiciary to determine whether a more compact district could have been
drawn .... ").
In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 399, 805 A.2d at 344
(Raker, j., dissenting).
See id. at 354, 805 A.2d at 317.
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to single government by allocating too much power to the courts and
forgetting about the legislature and its vital role in designing district
maps, a role the legislature is fully competent to handle itself.
Brooke Erin Moore

